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RESPECTING LANGUAGE AS
PART OF ETHNICITY: TITLE VII AND
LANGUAGE DISCRIMINATION AT WORK
Carlo A. Pedrioli*
Language is the carrier and vessel of culture . . . .1
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after Larry Whitten took over the Paragon Inn in Taos, New
Mexico, he ordered his employees to refrain from speaking Spanish in his
presence.2  Additionally, Whitten instructed employees with Latin names
to Anglicize their names at work.3  For instance, Martı´n was to become
* Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University.  B.A. (summa cum laude), Communi-
cation and English, 1999, California State University, Stanislaus; JD, 2002, Univer-
sity of the Pacific; M.A., Communication, 2003, University of Utah; Ph.D.,
Communication, 2005, University of Utah.  The author is a member of the State Bar
of California.
For thoughtful responses to earlier drafts of this Article, the author gratefully
acknowledges Roberto Avant-Mier of the University of Texas at El Paso (formerly of
Boston College), Linda E. Coco of Barry University, Melanie Conroy of Stanford
University, Judith E. Koons of Barry University, and Daniel P. O’Gorman of Barry
University.  Each reviewer offered a different perspective that greatly enriched the
manuscript.  For an introduction to the problem of language discrimination, the au-
thor thanks William N. Nguyen of the California Department of Industrial Rela-
tions, Division of Occupational Safety and Health (formerly of the Legal Aid Society
– Employment Law Center).  For thorough and timely research assistance, the au-
thor thanks Emily Criste of Barry University’s law class of 2011.
The author presented an earlier version of this Article as part of a Communica-
tion and Law panel at the 96th annual meeting of the National Communication
Association in San Francisco, California, in November 2010.  That version of the
Article received Top Three Paper recognition in the Communication and Law
Division.
1. Juan F. Perea, Buscando Ame´rica: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect
Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1427 (2004).
2. Hotel Owner Tells Hispanic Workers to Change Names, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 26, 2009,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/201013878
1_apustroubleintaos.html [hereinafter “Hotel Owner Tells”].  Whitten maintained
that, since the employees appeared “hostile” to the management style of the former
Marine, Whitten thought that the employees might start talking about him in Span-
ish. Id.  Fired hotel manager Kathy Archuleta said that she and her colleagues had
tried to adjust to Whitten’s management style. Id.
3. Matthew van Buren, Civil Rights Group Eyes Legal Options in Whitten Inn Fight; Owner
Plans to Sell, TAOS NEWS, Sept. 14, 2009, available at http://www.taosnews.com/
articles/2009/09/14/news/doc4aaa7d3d3a61d075317737.txt.
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Martin, and Marco was to become Mark.4  When several Latino employ-
ees refused to comply with these requirements, Whitten, who was White
and did not speak Spanish, fired the employees.5  Not only did the em-
ployees suffer the financial consequences of this employer’s action, but
they also suffered the consequences of the erasure of their ethnicity.
This scenario from New Mexico is an example of how discrimination
against employees, particularly lower-income employees, who speak
Languages Other Than English (LOTEs) in the workplace is an ongoing
phenomenon in the United States.6  Sometimes xenophobia is the cause of
this discrimination,7 but often such discrimination takes aim at individu-
als whose cultures simply are not Anglo-Saxon-based.8  Although Span-
ish was spoken in what became the United States before English was,9
some English-speaking people fear the loss of control that they think will
come when others speak Spanish.10  Regardless of where Spanish-speak-
ing individuals were born or whether they are U.S. citizens, employers
discursively construct such individuals “as ‘foreign’ or ‘un-American.’” 11
This rhetorical performance perpetuates the English/Non-English dual-
ism, through which one pole, English, stands for “a value to be sought,”
and the other pole, Non-English, stands for “a negative to be avoided.”12
Given the sizeable growth within the national labor force of ethnic groups
whose primary languages are not English,13 this type of discrimination,
which furthers linguistic hierarchy,14 is unlikely to disappear soon.
4. Matthew van Buren, Whitten Inn Protest Draws Regional Support, TAOS NEWS, Nov.
14, 2009, available at http://www.taosnews.com/articles/2009/11/14/news/doc4
aff208200883498160378.txt.
5. Hotel Owner Tells, supra note 2.  One fired employee, Martı´n Gutierrez, informed
Whitten that people in New Mexico had spoken Spanish before English, but Whit-
ten told Gutierrez that Whitten did not care because the business belonged to him.
Id.
6. See Robyn S. Stoter, Note, Discrimination & Deference: Making a Case for the EEOC’s
Expertise with English-Only Rules, 53 VILL. L. REV. 595, 596–97 (2008).
7. Mark L. Adams, Fear of Foreigners: Nativism and Workplace Language Restrictions, 74
OR. L. REV. 849, 850 (1995).
8. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 278 (1992).
9. Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965,
966 (1995).
10. Id. at 965.
11. Perea, supra note 8, at 278.  Often, when a society defines language, the society si-
multaneously defines nationality.  Chon A. Noriega, Waas Sappening?: Narrative
Structure and Iconography in Born in East L.A., in MEDIA/CULTURAL STUDIES 442
(Rhonda Hammer & Douglas Kellner eds., 2009) (citing DENNIS BARON, THE EN-
GLISH-ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE FOR AMERICANS? 6 (1990)).
12. MARY FIELD BELENKY, LYNNE A. BOND, & JACQUELINE S. WEINSTOCK, A TRADITION
THAT HAS NO NAME: NURTURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLE, FAMILIES, AND COM-
MUNITIES 20 (1997) (considering dualism in the context of gender).  These authors
also refer to dualisms as polarities. Id.
13. Mark Colo´n, Note, Line Drawing, Code Switching, and Spanish as Second-Hand Smoke:
English-Only Workplace Rules and Bilingual Employees, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227,
228 (2002).
14. BELENKY, BOND, & WEINSTOCK, supra note 12, at 20 (discussing hierarchy in the con-
text of gender).
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As the example from New Mexico suggests, one way in which em-
ployers discriminate against employees who speak LOTEs is based on the
employees’ use of LOTEs.  This Article uses the term language discrimina-
tion to refer to an employer’s adverse treatment, including termination, of
an employee who uses a non-privileged language at work.  In the United
States, non-privileged languages are generally LOTEs, particularly LOTEs
from non-European countries.  Restrictions on LOTEs vary.  In some
cases, employers have policies that ban the use of LOTEs in the work-
place.  In other cases, employers have policies that limit the use of LOTEs,
such as when employees may use LOTEs to speak with non-English-
speaking customers but not with anyone else.
Language is intimately linked to how people view one another and
the world.  Although linguists have put forward many competing defini-
tions of the term language, the broad consensus is that language is a sys-
tem of arbitrary relationships between symbols and meanings.15
Language usage is a complex human phenomenon that exploits the infi-
nite (re)combination of sound segments to produce words and
sentences.16  In sentences, words are arranged according to fixed rules.17
Basic categories of human identity, such as male and female, are present
across languages, just as the past, negation, questions, and commands
are.18  Any normal child, regardless of background, is capable of learning
any language.19  As complex as they are, languages change though time.20
This Article argues that, in the absence of a legitimate, non-discrimina-
tory reason or a business necessity, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
can protect employees from language-based discrimination in the work-
place.21  Language is a part of one’s ethnicity, which refers to one’s cul-
ture.  Ethnicity, much as race already does, should receive protection
under Title VII.  Plaintiffs, however, have the burden of proof in litiga-
tion, and so a plaintiff who sues under a discrimination theory should
have to make his or her case to the appropriate fact-finder.
Drawing upon the insights of critical theory, particularly to explore
concepts like ethnicity and race in a dynamic way, the Article will de-
velop this position in two major sections.  Section II of the Article will
look at the current state of the law and will consist of subsections on Title
VII claims in general, language discrimination and national origin, and
circuit approaches to language discrimination cases.  Section III of the Ar-
15. VICTORIA FROMKIN & ROBERT RODMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 25 (5th ed.
1993).  The definition offered in this paragraph includes some of the major aspects
of language but is not necessarily all-encompassing.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 26.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 25.
21. Although this Article focuses on Title VII claims, other federal claims, both statutory
and constitutional, are possible in cases of language discrimination.  For instance, in
the case of a governmental employer that discriminates based on language, an em-
ployee could sue under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006), overruled in part by Metz-
ler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006).
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ticle will address proposals for reforming the law and will include sub-
sections on amendments to Title VII, responses to objections to the
proposed amendments, disparate impact and disparate treatment analy-
ses in the courts, and the linguistic situations of monolingual and bilin-
gual speakers.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Title VII Claims Generally
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”22  The
statute applies to a variety of “persons,” including “one or more individ-
uals, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor
unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives,
mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organi-
zations, trustees, trustees in cases under Title 11, or receivers.”23  An em-
ployer is such a “person.”  To fall under Title VII, an employer must be
“engaged in an industry affecting commerce” and have at least fifteen
employees “for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.”24  Federal protection
against language-based discrimination by employers frequently, although
not always, comes under the national origin category in Title VII.25
In bringing a Title VII claim for discrimination, a plaintiff can sue
under either a disparate treatment or disparate impact theory.  Under a
disparate treatment theory, the plaintiff must show that the employer in-
tentionally discriminated against the employee.26  Once the plaintiff has
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2011).  This Article makes no claim that Title VII has suc-
ceeded completely in eliminating the types of discrimination it sought to eliminate.
Expressed legal principles and enacted practices are not always the same.  Angela
G. Ray & Cindy Koenig Richards, Inventing Citizens, Imagining Gender Justice: The
Suffrage Rhetoric of Virginia and Francis Minor, 93 Q. J. SPEECH 375, 375 (2007).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).
24. Id. § 2000e(b).  The federal government does not fall under the category “em-
ployer.” Id.  Nonetheless, Title VII generally covers the federal government. See id.
§ 2000e-16(a).
25. Melissa Meitus, English-Only Policies in the Workplace: Disparate Impact Compared to
the EEOC Guidelines, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 901, 903 (2007).
In addition to federal law, state law can provide protection against discrimina-
tion based on language. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12951 (2010).  This section of
the California Government Code provides the following:  “It is an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer . . . to adopt or enforce a policy that limits or
prohibits the use of any language in any workplace . . . .” Id. § 12951(a).  Exceptions
are permissible where the employer has a business necessity and “has notified its
employees of the circumstances and the time when the language restriction is re-
quired to be observed and of the consequences for violating the language restric-
tion.” Id. § 12951(a)(2).  For a discussion of the California statute, see Karen L.
Turner, Comment, Chapter 295: Codification of California’s Fair Employment and Hous-
ing Commission Regulations Governing Workplace Language Policies, 33 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 433 (2002).  For a similar statute in Illinois, see 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(A-
5) (2011), which deems imposing a restriction that has the effect of prohibiting a
language from being spoken by an employee in communications unrelated to the
employee’s duties a civil rights violation.
26. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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put on evidence to suggest that the employer treated him or her differ-
ently based on membership in a protected class, the burden then shifts to
the employer to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for the
treatment.27  After the employer meets that burden, the employee has to
show that the employer’s proffered reason is a pretext for
discrimination.28
Under a disparate impact theory, the plaintiff does not have to show
discriminatory intent.29  Rather, the plaintiff needs to show that the em-
ployer’s policy discriminated against the plaintiff in his or her capacity as
a member of a protected group.30  After the plaintiff has shown the dis-
proportionate impact, the defendant needs to show a business necessity
for the rule.31  If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff can prevail
by showing that the employer could have used other non-discriminatory
means to meet the business necessity.32
Title VII claims based on language discrimination often, but not al-
ways, fall under a theory of disparate impact.  Usually an employer’s rule
against using LOTEs applies to everyone, so the rule is facially neutral.33
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff would not have to show discrim-
inatory intent.
B. Language Discrimination and National Origin
Title VII does not specifically prohibit discrimination based on lan-
guage, but it does prohibit discrimination based on national origin.34
Courts often use the national origin category of Title VII to address mat-
ters of language discrimination.  Part of the problem with the state of the
law on Title VII stems from confusion over the national origin terminol-
ogy in the statute and how language discrimination relates to national
origin.35
Congress failed to put much effort into explaining its understanding
of national origin.36  Prior to appearing in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the
term national origin had appeared in executive and legislative rhetoric
throughout much of the twentieth century.37  For example, in the 1920s,
favoring immigration from northern European countries, Congress had
27. Id.
28. Id. at 804.
29. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
30. See id.
31. Id. at 431.  Previously, the defendant did not have the burden of proof in the second
step of the framework. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659–60
(1989).  However, in 1991 Congress changed the statute to give the employer the
burden of proof at this stage. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105,
105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2011)).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
33. Raechel L. Adams, Comment, English-Only in the Workplace: A New Judicial Lens Will
Provide More Comprehensive Title VII Protection, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1327, 1339 (1998).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
35. Steven I. Locke, Language Discrimination and English-Only Rules in the Workplace: The
Case for Legislative Amendment of Title VII, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 50 (1996).
36. Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination
Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 817 (1994).
37. Id. at 810–17.
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restricted immigration based on national origin.38  The idea was that quo-
tas would preserve the ethnic composition of the United States.39  In the
1960s, when Congress debated the Civil Rights Act, only a handful of
members of the House of Representatives and Senate went on the record
addressing the term, and their few remarks indicated that national origin
referred to one’s place of birth or the places of birth of one’s ancestors.40
The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that the history of the term is
“quite meager.”41  In contrast, Congress spent much more time address-
ing race, particularly because of the extensive historical and continuing
discrimination against Black Americans, most of whom were born in the
United States.42
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the
federal agency that enforces civil rights laws, offered its own definition of
the term national origin discrimination.  According to the EEOC, the term
includes, but is not limited to, “the denial of equal employment opportu-
nity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place of origin; or
because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteris-
tics of a national origin group.”43  The EEOC observed that “[t]he primary
language of an individual is often an essential national origin characteris-
tic.”44  Limiting use of such a language “disadvantages an individual’s
employment opportunities on the basis of national origin [and] may also
create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on
national origin which could result in a discriminatory working environ-
ment.”45  While more detailed than the congressional definition, the
EEOC definition, along with an accompanying explanation, lacks the
force of law since the EEOC does not have substantive rulemaking
authority.46
38. Perea, supra note 9, at 982. See also Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153,
155, 159.
39. Perea, supra note 9, at 982.
40. Perea, supra note 36, at 820–21.
41. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88–89 (1973).
42. Perea, supra note 36, at 817.  Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act before mass
immigration from Latin America had developed.  In the mid-1960s, Blacks outnum-
bered other minorities such as Latinos.  James Leonard, Bilingualism and Equality:
Title VII Claims for Language Discrimination in the Workplace, 38 U. MICH J. L. REFORM
57, 102–03 (2004).  Today, Latinos constitute the largest minority group in the
United States. ROBERTO AVANT-MIER, ROCK THE NATION:  LATIN/O IDENTITIES AND
THE LATIN ROCK DIASPORA 1 (2010).  The U.S. Census has recognized the increase in
the size of the Latin community in the United States.  Beginning in 1970, the Census
included a category called Hispanic, and, as of 2000, the Census included the um-
brella category Latino. Id. at 2.
On a related note, critics have observed that most of the discussions on race and
the law have focused on African-Americans to the detriment of other minority
groups.  In more recent years, scholars from non-African-American minority posi-
tions have added to the discussion. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian Amer-
ican Legal Scholarship:  Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81
CALIF. L. REV. 1241, 1265 (1993).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2011).
44. Id. § 1606.7(a).
45. Id.
46. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
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C. Circuit Approaches to Language Discrimination Cases
In light of the lack of U.S. Supreme Court precedent on language dis-
crimination, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have had to develop their own
approaches to language discrimination cases.  The appellate courts often
have followed a burden-shifting model that the Supreme Court set out in
other Title VII cases, but this model has varied over the years.
In the early 1980s, the Fifth Circuit decided the first federal appellate
case on language discrimination under Title VII.47  Seeing the language of
bilingual employees, unlike national origin, as mutable, the Fifth Circuit
declined to view an English-only policy as an impetus for discrimination
based on national origin.48  The Fifth Circuit also briefly summarized bus-
iness reasons for the treatment of an employee who had spoken Spanish
at work.49  The court did not follow an explicit burden-shifting analysis.50
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Ninth Circuit took the lead in ad-
dressing language discrimination cases under Title VII,51 although the
court twice changed its approach to analyzing these cases.  Under the ini-
tial approach, which paralleled the model used in disparate treatment
cases,52 the court adopted the perspective that the employee first should
have to make a prima facie case for discrimination.53  Then the employer
47. In Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), the court rejected a disparate impact
claim. Id. at 270.  Employer Gloor Lumber and Supply had fired Hector Garcia,
who was Mexican-American and bilingual in English and Spanish, for several rea-
sons, including using Spanish on the job in violation of an English-only rule. Id. at
266–67.  Despite the English-only rule, Spanish was allowed when employees were
communicating with Spanish-speaking customers and during breaks. Id. at 266.
Non-English speakers who worked outside did not have to speak English. Id.  The
actions in question involved Mr. Garcia’s responding to another Mexican-American
in Spanish, as well as his failing to keep his inventory current, replenish the stock
on display, keep his area clean, and respond to various reprimands. Id.  According
to the trial court, Mr. Garcia previously had violated the English-only rule at every
opportunity. Id. at 266–67.
Gloor Lumber offered several business reasons for the policy.  They included the
following:  addressing English-speaking customers’ objections to employees’ com-
munications in Spanish that the English-speaking customers could not understand,
facilitating employees’ reading trade literature only available in English, improving
employees’ English skills, and allowing non-Spanish-speaking supervisors to over-
see subordinates’ work. Id. at 267.
48. Id. at 269–71.
49. Id. at 267.
50. Given its citation to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the court probably
would have followed a burden-shifting analysis if the court had determined that a
disparate impact claim was appropriate. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270.
51. Meitus, supra note 25, at 902.
52. In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987), the court upheld the trial
court’s rejection of both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. Id. at
1411–12.  Employer and radio station KIIS had fired Valentine Jurado, who was
Mexican-American and Native-American, as well as bilingual in English and Span-
ish, for continuing to speak Spanish on the air during the program he hosted. Id. at
1408.  The employer previously had warned Jurado that, because a consultant had
advised the radio station to move away from the Spanish-language format in an
attempt to improve ratings, Jurado would need to stop using Spanish on the air. Id.
53. Id. at 1409.  Although the court focused on a disparate treatment theory rather than
on the usual disparate impact theory, the court briefly noted that, to make a prima
facie case for a disparate impact claim, the plaintiff would need to show that an
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would have to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its em-
ployment decision.54  Finally, the employee would need to show that the
employer’s proffered reason for the treatment was a pretext for
discrimination.55
Within one year, focusing on a disparate impact matter, the court took
a noticeably different approach to language discrimination cases.56  In
looking to EEOC guidelines on the subject, the Ninth Circuit found that
“English-only rules generally have an adverse impact on protected
groups and that they should be closely scrutinized.”57  The EEOC had
identified two types of English-only rules in the workplace:  those that
applied at all times and those that applied only at certain times.58  The
rules that applied at all times were “burdensome.”59  The rules that ap-
plied only at certain times were permissible only if the employer had a
business necessity for the rules.60  If an employer had a business necessity,
the employer had to provide the employees with advance notice of the
limitation on using LOTEs.61  Following the EEOC guidelines, the court
put the real burden of proof on the employer.  Provided that an employee
could show that an employer had established an English-only rule, a min-
imal showing, the employer had to demonstrate that it had a business
necessity for the rule, which is what the EEOC had proposed.62  The tran-
employment practice had a significant and adverse impact on the protected group.
Id. at 1412.  The employee would not need to show intent to discriminate. Id.
54. Id. at 1409.
55. Id.
56. In Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District, County of Los Angeles,
838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989), the court, by
accepting that a disparate impact argument had a likelihood of success on the mer-
its, upheld the granting of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of an En-
glish-only rule. Id. at 1036.  The Southeast Judicial District of the Los Angeles
Municipal Court had developed a policy that forbade employees from speaking
Spanish unless the employees were acting as translators.  Id.  Eventually, the rule
did not apply during breaks and lunch. Id.  Alva Gutierrez, who was Latina, bilin-
gual, and a deputy court clerk, filed an EEOC charge and later a lawsuit. Id.
The employer offered a list of reasons for the policy.  According to the employer,
the rule was necessary to comport with California’s being an English-speaking state,
to avoid allowing the workplace to become a “Tower of Babel,” to promote racial
harmony, to allow English-speaking supervisors to understand subordinates who
were communicating information to the public, and to adhere to the California Con-
stitution’s requirement that all state business be conducted in English.  Id. at
1041–44.
57. Id. at 1040.
58. 29 C.F.R.§ 1606.7(a)–(b) (2011).
59. Id. § 1606.7(a).
60. Id. § 1606.7(b).
61. Id. § 1606.7(c).
62. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039–40. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7.  The EEOC issued its
guidelines shortly after the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Garcia v. Gloor, 618
F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
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sition to the new standard was not necessarily smooth,63 and the U.S. Su-
preme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision as moot.64
Eventually, the Ninth Circuit settled on an approach to analyzing lan-
guage discrimination cases that was very similar to the original approach
that it had adopted.65  The court, analyzing the case under a disparate
impact theory, stated that the employee must make a prima facie case for
discrimination that shows that “a specific, seemingly neutral practice or
policy” had “a significantly adverse impact” on the employee, who is a
member of a protected class.66  If the employee can meet this burden, the
employer has to show that the policy is related to the job and a business
necessity.67  The court did not specifically address the opportunity for a
plaintiff to show that the employer could have used non-discriminatory
means to meet the business necessity.68  Once again, the transition be-
tween standards was not necessarily smooth.69
63. In Gutierrez, when the court called upon the EEOC guidelines while also justifying
its favorable citing of Gloor in Jurado, the court made factual distinctions between
Gutierrez and Jurado.  838 F.2d at 1041.  However, the Gutierrez court had a difficult
time explaining how the plaintiff-deferential EEOC guidelines were consistent with
the court in Gloor, which was hardly deferential to the plaintiff.  Somehow the Gu-
tierrez court felt it could, and had to, reconcile Gloor, the guidelines, and Ninth Cir-
cuit precedent.  Despite differing facts, the court failed to justify the then-most-
recent version of its fluctuating legal standard.
Given the weakness of the factual distinction as an adequate justification for the
change in legal standard, the varying compositions of the panels that heard the two
cases should receive consideration.  In Jurado, Judges Warren J. Ferguson, Robert
Boochever, and Charles Wiggins heard the case.  Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813
F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1987).  In Gutierrez, Judges James R. Browning, Thomas
Tang, and Stephen Reinhardt heard the case.  838 F.2d at 1036.
Ironically, in Jurado, Judge Boochever agreed with the court’s requirement that
the plaintiff make a prima facie case.  Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1409.  Later, in Garcia,
Boochever dissented when the court utilized the same requirement.  Garcia v. Spun
Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993).
64. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d 1031.
65. In Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), the court reversed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment based on a claim of disparate impact.  After
employer Spun Steak had received complaints that some bilingual workers were
insulting and harassing other workers in a language that other workers could not
understand, the company adopted an English-only rule to be in effect outside lunch
and break time. Id. at 1483.  Employees Garcia and Buitrago, Latinos who were
bilingual in Spanish and English, allegedly had insulted two colleagues, one an Af-
rican-American and the other a Chinese-American. Id.  How strictly Spun Steak
enforced the English-only rule was unclear, but, when Garcia and Buitrago contin-
ued to speak Spanish during working hours, the two men received warning letters
from the company. Id. Eventually, Local 115 filed an EEOC complaint and later a
lawsuit. Id. at 1483–84.
66. Id. at 1486.
67. Id.
68. The court did not find that the employees had made a prima facie case, so the court
never addressed business necessity. Id. at 1490.  Thus, the court did not have the
opportunity to determine whether the employer could have used other non-dis-
criminatory means to meet the business necessity.
69. One explanation for the change in standard for the analytical framework is that the
U.S. Supreme Court had vacated the prior decision.  The court in Spun Steak ob-
served, “The case has no precedential authority, however, because it was vacated as
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In the 2000s, the Tenth Circuit, less in a state of flux than the Ninth
Circuit, decided a case70 that, for a disparate impact theory, adopted the
same analytical framework that the Ninth Circuit eventually had
adopted.71  This approach included a prima facie case for discrimination
and a defendant’s response of business necessity.  However, the Tenth
Circuit, drawing upon EEOC guidelines, suggested that a jury could find
that an English-only rule in the workplace was discriminatory and hos-
tile.72  Under this approach, which followed the general burden-shifting
approach for Title VII cases outlined above, but which gave a nod to the
“body of experience and informed judgment” found within the EEOC
guidelines,73 the analysis could turn more easily to a consideration of a
business necessity for the English-only policy.  The court did not state
“that the guideline is evidence admissible at trial or should be incorpo-
rated in a jury instruction.”74  Rather, the court cautiously indicated “only
that a juror presented with the evidence presently on the record in this
case would not be unreasonable in finding that a hostile work environ-
ment existed.”75  A hostile work environment claim, through which a
plaintiff maintains that an atmosphere of discrimination at work was
moot by the Supreme Court.  We are in no way bound by its reasoning.” Id. at 1487
n.1.
Another explanation involves the varying compositions of the two panels that
made the decisions.  In Gutierrez, Judges James R. Browning, Thomas Tang, and Ste-
phen Reinhardt heard the case.  Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of the Southeast Judi-
cial District, County of Los Angeles, 838 F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as
moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).  In Spun Steak, Judges Robert Boochever, John T. Noonan,
and Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain heard the case.  998 F.2d at 1482.  Judge Boochever
dissented in Spun Steak. Id. at 1490.
Ironically, in Jurado, Judge Boochever agreed with the court’s requirement that
the plaintiff make a prima facie case.  Several years later, in Spun Steak, Boochever
dissented when the court utilized the same requirement.
70. In Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006), the court reversed the
trial court’s decision to dismiss both disparate impact and disparate treatment
claims.  The City of Altus, Oklahoma, had adopted an English-only policy after re-
ceiving a complaint that, since some employees in the Street Department were
speaking in Spanish, other employees were unable to understand messages over the
City radio. Id. at 1298.  The employees in question were Latino and fluently bilin-
gual. Id.  The policy did not apply during breaks and lunch, or with regard to brief
communication with relatives. Id. at 1299–1300.
The City offered three main reasons for the English-only policy.  Employees
could not understand what was said over the radio, non-Spanish-speaking employ-
ees were uncomfortable when Spanish-speaking employees spoke Spanish in front
of them, and use of a non-common language constituted a safety issue when heavy
equipment was in use. Id. at 1300.
Additionally, several Latino employees stated they had been teased because of
the English-only policy. Id. at 1301.  The employees filed an EEOC complaint and
later a lawsuit. Id. at 1301–02.
71. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1304.
72. Id. at 1305–06.
73. Id. at 1305.
74. Id. at 1306.
75. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HBK\27-1\HBK103.txt unknown Seq: 11 19-JUL-11 14:28
RESPECTING LANGUAGE AS A PART OF ETHNICITY ■ 107
“sufficiently severe or pervasive,”76 can be a type of disparate impact or
disparate treatment claim.77  For a theory of disparate treatment, the court
noted that the plaintiff would have to show intent to discriminate, and
the court could infer intent from conduct.78
In another case shortly thereafter, the Tenth Circuit iterated its prior
observation that an English-only rule can create a hostile work environ-
ment.79  Nonetheless, the court said that, when an English-only policy is
narrow, supported by an “undisputed business necessity,” and lacking
discriminatory motive or effect, the policy can be legal.80  One “undis-
puted business necessity” is “clear and precise communication” in the
workplace.81
Although the decisions from the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits con-
stitute the leading federal appellate decisions in language discrimination
cases to date, two other circuits have issued minor decisions in this area
of the law.  In the 1990s, the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit is-
sued, either without opinion or published opinion, decisions on language
discrimination.  Without opinion, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a lower
court decision that said that an English-only rule enforced against bilin-
gual employees was not discriminatory in violation of Title VII.82  In a
brief unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit adopted the standard that,
to make a prima facie case for discriminatory enforcement of employment
76. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–67 (1986) (considering sexual harass-
ment and holding that a plaintiff can prevail under Title VII if the plaintiff proves
that a hostile work environment existed).
77. L. Camille Hebert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment:  Does Motive Matter?, 53
KAN. L. REV. 341, 351–63 (2005) (considering sexual harassment, which can be a type
of hostile work environment).  The general thinking is that hostile work environ-
ment cases are disparate treatment cases, but not all commentators agree that all
hostile work environment cases have to be disparate treatment cases.  Rather, some
hostile work environment cases can be disparate impact cases. Id.
78. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1308.
79. In Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007), the court upheld the trial
court’s granting of summary judgment on various discrimination claims.  Several
former employees of the Vail Clinic had sued their former employer for discrimina-
tion.  Eva Escobedo, the one plaintiff who claimed that the employer had discrimi-
nated against her based on her use of a LOTE, was of Mexican descent and had
worked as a housekeeper at the clinic. Id. at 1168.  Escobedo, who had difficulty
speaking English, had received an instruction to speak only English in the operating
rooms.  Id. However, the employer allowed Escobedo to speak Spanish during
breaks and outside the operating room. Id. at 1169.  The proffered business reason
for the rule was to facilitate effective communication in the operating room, an envi-
ronment in which most of the nurses with whom Escobedo worked did not speak
English. Id. at 1171.
80. Id. at 1171–72.
81. Id. at 1171.
82. In Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, 985 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1993), the court affirmed the
trial court’s decision that an English-only rule did not violate Title VII. See also Gon-
zalez v. Salvation Army, 1991 WL 11009376, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 1991) (unpub-
lished district court opinion).  The employer had received complaints from non-
Spanish-speaking employees that Spanish-speaking employees were talking in
Spanish about the employees who did not speak Spanish. Id. at *2.  Also, a client
had complained about a Spanish language conversation about condoms; Ivette Gon-
zalez, the plaintiff, had participated in that conversation. Id.  Gonzalez spoke both
English and Spanish. Id. at *1.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HBK\27-1\HBK103.txt unknown Seq: 12 19-JUL-11 14:28
108 ■ HARVARD JRNL ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUSTICE ■ VOL. 27, 2011
rules under Title VII, the employee would need to show membership in a
protected class, comparable misconduct by the employee and members
outside the protected class, and more severe enforcement of the rules
against the member of the protected class.83  Neither of these circuit courts
addressed the EEOC guidelines.  Given the lack of developed, published
opinions from the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits, the discourse these cir-
cuits have produced on language discrimination is of limited utility in a
policy discussion.
In general, then, the Ninth Circuit’s current framework for analyzing
language discrimination cases84 has become the tentative standard in the
absence of a specific case from the Supreme Court.  Although the Tenth
Circuit has recognized the merits of the EEOC guidelines, it declined to
adopt the guidelines, and no other circuit to date consistently has
adopted those guidelines.
III. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE LAW
A. Amending Title VII to Address Language Discrimination More
Completely
Although the federal circuit courts have analyzed language discrimi-
nation cases under national origin, ethnicity is a necessary term for ad-
dressing many cases of language discrimination.  Congress should amend
Title VII to include ethnicity in the list of protected categories.85  Ethnicity
opens rhetorical space for arguments that language, which is a part of
ethnicity, can receive protection.
One’s national origin is where one was born.86  A monolingual or bi-
lingual speaker, such as a Latino,87 who at least speaks a LOTE and may
speak a LOTE as well as English, could have been born in the United
States.  Claiming that one suffered discrimination because he or she was
born in the United States does not make sense since the business owner
who discriminated also could have been born in the United States.  Given
the language that Congress provided in Title VII, national origin may
have been a good possibility for use in some cases of language-based dis-
83. In Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 12431, at *4–5 (4th Cir. May
29, 1996), the court upheld the trial court’s decision of granting summary judgment
on a disparate treatment claim.  A bank branch manager had announced orally, and
later re-announced in writing, an English-only rule because the manager felt that
speaking Spanish in front of English-speakers was rude. Id. at *2–3.  One of the
plaintiffs, who was Latina, refused to sign the memorandum that announced the
policy. Id. at *3.  An EEOC complaint ensued, and the bank, with a new branch
manager, rescinded the policy. Id. at *4 n.5.  Nonetheless, a lawsuit ensued. Id.
84. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993).
85. The EEOC Employee Selection Guidelines already include reference to “ethnic
group.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(A) (2011).
86. Perea, supra note 36, at 832.
87. Various terms refer to individuals who are of Latin American descent.  The term
Latino is a pan-ethnic term.  Susana Rinderle, Quie´nes Son, Quie´nes Somos: A Criti-
cal Analysis of the Changing Names for People of Mexican Descent Across History, 29
INT’L & INTERCULT’L COMM. ANN. 143, 156 (2006).  In contrast to Hispanic, which
emphasizes assimilation into mainstream U.S. culture, Latino emphasizes preserva-
tion of culture and addressing social injustice. Id. at 156.
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crimination, but the term fails to address many other situations of lan-
guage-based discrimination.  The term is appropriate only when the
employee was born in another country that does not have English as one
of its major languages.
In cases of native-born employees, use of the national origin category
under Title VII employs the ideograph <American> in a manner rhetori-
cally harmful to individuals who speak LOTEs.  An ideograph is an ordi-
nary language term found in discourse and an abstraction that shows a
collective commitment to a vague normative goal, justifies the use of
power, excuses behavior otherwise generally not excused, and explains
behavior such that a community will accept it.88  Ideographs are generally
culturally-specific and shed light on the ideology of a communicator.89
Examples of ideographs include <confidentiality>, <national security>,
<rule of law>, <freedom of speech>, <liberty>, <religion>, and
<property>.90  At different times and through different rhetorics, com-
municators might use such ideographs to justify keeping medical secrets,
starting wars, maintaining oppressive laws, criticizing the government,
allowing abortion, oppressing non-believing minorities, and perpetuating
class inequalities.91
In this case, the ideograph <American> is employed narrowly to
marginalize members of minority groups.  The assumption is that those
“who differ ethnically from unstated norms of [White] American iden-
tity” come from somewhere other than the United States.92  According to
this viewpoint, Whites, who often speak only English, are from the
United States, but non-Whites, who may use other languages, originate
from elsewhere.  Apparently, White individuals never came from other
countries.  The consequence is rhetorical marginalization of members of
minority ethnic groups.93
88. Michael Calvin McGee, The “Ideograph”: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology, 66 Q. J.
SPEECH 1, 15 (1980).  Communication scholars often use the characters “<” and
“>” to identify the ideographs they are discussing.
Not all communication scholars accept that an ideograph has to be an ordinary
language term.  For instance, two scholars have argued that use of the image of the
U.S. military personnel who raised the flag on the Pacific island of Iwo Jima near
the end of World War II constitutes use of an ideograph. See Janis L. Edwards &
Carol K. Winkler, Representative Form and the Visual Ideograph: The Iwo Jima Image in
Editorial Cartoons, 83 Q. J. SPEECH 289 (1997).
89. McGee, supra note 88, at 15.
90. Id. at 12, 13, 16.  For ideographic analyses, see, e.g., John Louis Lucaites & Celeste
Michelle Condit, Reconstructing <Equality>:  Culturetypal and Counter-Cultural Rhet-
orics in the Martyred Black Vision, 57 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 5 (1990); Dana L. Cloud,
“To Veil the Threat of Terror”: Afghan Women and the <Clash of Civilizations> in the
Imagery of the U.S. War on Terrorism, 90 Q. J. SPEECH 285 (2004); Bryan J. McCann,
Therapeutic and Material <Victim> hood:  Ideology and the Struggle for Meaning in the
Illinois Death Penalty Controversy, 4 COMM. & CRIT./CULT. STUD. 382 (2007); and Sara
Hayden, Revitalizing the Debate between <Life> and <Choice>:  The 2004 March for
Women’s Lives, 6 COMM. & CRIT./CULT. STUD. 111 (2009).
91. See authorities cited in immediately preceding footnote.
92. Perea, supra note 36, at 856.
93. Id. at 856–57 (discussing marginalization in general, although not in rhetorical
terms).
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Congress apparently deemed that national origin also includes the na-
tions of birth of an individual’s ancestors,94 but this use of the term is
illogical.  Under such a definition, a plaintiff would need to claim that he
suffered discrimination based on someone else’s national origin rather
than his or her own.  The term ancestry is more logical for referring to
one’s descent or lineage, and such a term is broader than national origin
since the former can refer to several ancestors and their respective na-
tional origins.95
Although more sophisticated than the congressional definition, the
part of the EEOC definition of national origin that goes beyond the con-
gressional definition and accounts for discrimination based on “physical,
cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group”96 is like-
wise unsatisfactory.  In the case of an individual member of “a national
origin group” who was born in the United States, the focus turns to the
country or countries from which the individual’s relatives came, and, in
turn, to the individual’s ancestry.  Again, one would be bringing a claim
on the characteristics of other individuals rather than one’s own
characteristics.
Given that, in different ways, national origin can be problematic for
many Title VII cases, looking to other possible categories becomes neces-
sary, and ethnicity becomes operative.  The term ethnicity, from the Greek
word ethnos, which means people or nation,97 refers to one’s socializa-
tion,98 usually into a particular cultural group comprised of customs,
foods, religious practices, celebrations, language, and national origin.
Ethnicity involves self-identification, knowledge about the culture, feel-
ings about being a part of that group, and a sense of the history of the
group.99  Other aspects of ethnicity include how people express them-
selves, think, move, solve problems, plan cities, establish economies, and
form governments.100  Examples of different ethnicities include Mexican
American, Japanese American, Welsh American, Navajo, and Hopi
ethnicities.101
As suggested, language “is one of the primary aspects of ethnicity.”102
More specifically, language is “a symbol system that embodies essential
94. Id. at 832.
95. Id.
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2011).
97. Perea, supra note 8, at 277 (citing MILTON M. GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN THE AMERI-
CAN LIFE 24 (1964)).
98. Ame´rica Rodriguez, Objectivity and Ethnicity in the Production of the Noticiero Univi-
sio´n, 13 CRIT. STUD. MASS COMM. 59, 61 (1996) (focusing on ethnicity of U.S. Lati-
nos/as).  Ethnicity is learned. See EDWARD T. HALL, BEYOND CULTURE 18–20 (1976)
(explaining how White cultures often use time monochronically, or in a linear and
scheduled way).
99. JUDITH N. MARTIN & THOMAS K. NAKAYAMA, INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN
CONTEXTS 74 (1997).
100. HALL, supra note 98, at 16–17 (discussing how culture touches and alters life).  As
Hall suggests, ethnicity includes both ways of behaving and thinking.  In that sense,
religion is much like ethnicity, and Title VII provides for protection of both religious
conduct as well as religious belief.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2011).
101. MARTIN & NAKAYAMA, supra note 99, at 74.
102. Perea, supra note 8, at 277.
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characteristics of [an] ethnic group,”103 and language facilitates the under-
standing of social interactions,104 especially in one’s own cultural group.
Also, language can define identities.105  Language can be a tool for op-
pressing others and for resisting oppression.106  Although humans are
predisposed to learn languages,107 the language one learns is a function of
the culture in which one grows up.  Currently, Title VII does not address
ethnicity or language.
Since ethnicity, including language, is a concept closely related to race,
an existing protected category under Title VII, some discussion of race
will help to develop a more thorough understanding of ethnicity.  Mean-
ings of the term race have fluctuated over the years, and, despite the im-
portance of the concept, courts rarely have defined race.108  One reason for
the lack of judicial definitions of race is that race is “a problematic cate-
gory that confounds attempts to define it.”109  Race “is easily destabilized,
and must be treated as a contested term, its meaning shifting with the
rhetorical strategies summoned by the rhetor.”110
Even though defining race has been difficult, race historically referred
to one’s biological makeup111 and often was used to marginalize members
of minority groups.  Although identifying “distinctive human groups”
based on “difference in physical appearance” goes back to the Bible and
beyond,112 the modern notion of race as a biological phenomenon devel-
103. Rodriguez, supra note 98, at 64.  Language, through diction and accents, often gives
clues to one’s national origin. Id. at 65.  For example, the type of Spanish that a
Spanish-speaker uses can identify the speaker as being from Cuba or Puerto Rico.
Some Latino/a scholarship presents the notion that ethnicity and language are
one in the same.  One scholar has written, “Ethnic identity is twin skin to linguistic
identity – I am my language.” See GLORIA ANZALDU´A, BORDERLANDS/LA FRONTERA:
THE NEW MEZTIZA 81 (2d ed. 1999).
104. MEREDITH E. ABARCA, VOICES IN THE KITCHEN:  VIEWS OF FOOD AND THE WORLD FROM
WORKING-CLASS MEXICAN AND MEXICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 68 (2006).
105. Margaret E. Montoya, Law and Language(s): Image, Integration and Innovation, 7 LA
RAZA L.J. 147, 147 (1994).
106. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Corrido: Race, Postcolonial Theory, and U.S. Civil Rights, 60
VAND. L. REV. 1691, 1708–09 (2007).  Delgado notes that “the colonial subject who
adopts the language of the conqueror ‘has to convey in a language that is not one’s
own the spirit that is one’s own.  One has to convey the various shades and omis-
sions of a certain thought movement that looks maltreated in an alien language.’”
Id. at 1709 (presenting a conversation that quotes Raj Rao, Language and Spirit, in
THE POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES READER 296 (Bill Ashcroft et al. eds., 1995)).
107. Donald G. Ellis, Language and Communication, 42 COMM. EDUC. 79, 80 (1993).  Lan-
guage in general has a biological, as well as a cultural, dimension to it. Id. at 79.
108. ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL L. IZUMI, JERRY KANG, & FRANK H.
WU, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION:  LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT
5 (2001).
109. A. Cheree Carlson, “You Know It When You See It”:  The Rhetorical Hierarchy of Race
and Gender in Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, 85 Q. J. SPEECH 111, 111 (1999) (evaluating
the rhetorics related to a 1925 lawsuit in which a husband had accused his wife of
defrauding him into believing she was entirely White).
110. Id. at 126.
111. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 2–6 (2000); YAMAMOTO ET AL.,
supra note 108, at 5–6.
112. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  FROM
THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 61 (1994).
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oped during the Enlightenment,113 and during the middle of the eight-
eenth century, European scientists began to devise a system of racial
hierarchy that they used to create a “social pecking order[ ].”114  In 1735,
Carolus Linnaeus constructed what became “[t]he first authoritative ra-
cial division of humankind.”115  The categories of Homo sapiens that Lin-
naeus constructed were Americanus, Europeus, Asiaticus, and Afer.116  In
1787, Thomas Jefferson wrote of his suspicion that Blacks were “inferior
to whites in the endowments of both body and mind.”117  By the middle
of the nineteenth century in the United States, race was a function of cata-
loguing individuals’ physical features, including “crania, facial angles,
and brain mass.”118  Scientists, purporting to be “value-free subject[s],”119
and hiding behind the “‘belief that science was an objective tool engaged
in an “uninvolved” diagnosis of empirical reality,’” 120 claimed that differ-
ent biological features had links to people’s mental capacities.121  This cre-
ation of hierarchy supported the view that some minorities, such as
Chinese immigrants to the United States, were so different from the ma-
jority group that the minorities should not assimilate with the majority.122
In the wake of the Civil War, this type of hierarchy led to “almost a cen-
tury of legally sanctioned segregation and denial of the vote” for Black
Americans.123
By the early twentieth century, social scientists had theorized about
race as a cultural construct.124  Problems with a biological view of race
centered around how many races existed and what the criteria for each
race were.125  More recent science, including that developed as part of the
113. Judith E. Koons, Making Peace with Difference:  A Hermeneutic of Inclusive Conversation,
12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 26 (2002).
114. YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 108, at 6.
115. CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE!: AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRIS-
TIANITY 55–56 (1982).
116. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 404 (1996).  Linnaeus did not rank his
categories of human beings in the racist order that many Europeans of the day fa-
vored; rather, he organized the categories by geography. Id.  J. F. Blumenbach, a
student of Linnaeus, later added “a ‘Malay variety’ for some Pacific peoples origi-
nally included in a broader Asian group.” Id. at 401–03.  Although Blumenbach
probably did not have a racist intent, with the advent of Blumenbach’s taxonomy,
the ordering of categories of human beings changed from geographical ordering to
hierarchical ordering, a development that has promoted racism ever since. Id. at
405–06.  In commenting on this development, Gould asked, “[F]or what, short of
railroads and nuclear bombs, had more practical impact, in this case almost entirely
negative, upon our collective lives and nationalities[?]” Id. at 405.
117. YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 108, at 6.
118. Kirt H. Wilson, The Contested Space of Prudence in the 1874–1875 Civil Rights Debate, 84
Q. J. SPEECH 131, 143 (1998).  For more on the study of heads and bodies, as used in
the construction of racial hierarchy, see, e.g., GOULD, supra note 116, at 62–175.
119. WEST, supra note 115, at 53.
120. Wilson, supra note 118, at 143 (quoting JOHN S. HALLER, OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION:
SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF RACIAL INFERIORITY, 1859–1900 140 (1995)).
121. YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 108, at 6.
122. Id.
123. OMI & WINANT, supra note 112, at 66.
124. YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 108, at 6–7.
125. Id. at 7.
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Human Genome Project in the 1990s and early 2000s,126 has supported the
position that race does not exist in human genes.127  Indeed, too few genes
are involved in characteristics associated with race for there to be “dis-
tinct genetic signatures” for various racial groups.128  Rather, characteris-
tics associated with race are rather superficial.129
Today, race often refers to “a complex of social and economic relation-
ships.”130  This approach to race accounts for “the specific relational and
historical contexts in which racial categories arise, as well as the political
and economic influences that shape racial meaning.”131  The process
through which racial meanings develop is racial formation,132 and, al-
though Whites often do not have to think about race, race applies to eve-
ryone.133  Another way of describing race is race as performance, in which
one acts out a role for a given set of circumstances.134
In certain cases, race comes with privilege.  For example, to protect
their children, Whites do not have to educate their children “to be aware
126. The Human Genome Project was a research effort, begun in 1990 and completed in
2003, that the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health coor-
dinated.  Among other goals, the Human Genome Project aimed to identify the
20,000 to 25,000 genes in human DNA. About the Human Genome Project, HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT INFORMATION, http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_
Genome/project/about.shtml (last visited May 11, 2011).  The term genome refers to
“all the DNA in an organism, including its genes.” Id.
127. Robyn Suriano, Facing Who We Are:  The Human Genome Reveals That Race Isn’t In Our
Genes, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 27, 2001, available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.
com/2001-05-27/news/0105260032_1_race-human-genome-subspecies.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Carlson, supra note 109, at 111.
131. BELL, supra note 111, at 9.
132. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1994).
133. The notion that only non-White individuals have racial identity is a function of
whiteness.  “[W]hiteness is a social construction which produces race privilege for
white people by appearing racially ‘neutral,’ unlinked to racial politics, universal,
and unmarked.”  Aimee Carrillo Rowe & Sheen Malhotra, (Un)hinging Whiteness, 29
INTERNAT’L & INTERCULT’L COMM. ANN. 166, 170 (2006). See also Raka Shome, Out-
ing whiteness, 17 CRIT. STUD. MEDIA COMM. 366, 366 (2000) (noting that whiteness
leads to White privilege).  In masquerading as anti-racist or colorblind, “whiteness
moves with ease” from one rhetorical situation to another.  Lisa A. Flores, Dreama
G. Moon, & Thomas K. Nakayama, Dynamic Rhetorics of Race: California’s Racial Pri-
vacy Initiative and the Shifting Grounds of Racial Politics, 3 COMM. & CRIT./CULT. STUD.
181, 184 (2006).  Whiteness aside, all individuals, including Whites, have some type
of racial identity, and such identity becomes apparent when White individuals in-
teract with non-Whites. See Thomas K. Nakayama & Robert L. Krizak, Whiteness: A
Strategic Rhetoric, 81 Q. J. SPEECH 291, 299–300 (1995).
134. See, e.g., Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nine-
teenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 112–13 (1998) (examining how individuals in
the antebellum South used performance, including voting and sitting on juries, to
establish their race as White and thus gain access to the social privileges society
gave to Whites). See also Nadine Ehlers, Hidden in Plain Sight: Defying Juridical
Racialization in Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, 1 COMM. & CRIT./CULT. STUD. 313 (2004)
(considering the performance of race in a 1925 lawsuit in which a husband had
accused his wife of carrying out a racial fraud by maintaining that she was entirely
White).
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of systemic racism.”135  Also, Whites are not asked to speak for the mem-
bers of their racial group.136  One way of thinking of White privilege is
that it is “an invisible package of unearned assets which [a White person]
can count on cashing in each day, but about which [the White person]
was ‘meant’ to remain oblivious.”137  This privilege is much “like an in-
visible weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurance, tools, maps,
guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear,
and blank checks.”138
While race can be “a contested term,”139 the current Article, along
with most of the scholarship in this area,140 views race as a social con-
struction.141  This understanding is consistent with a contemporary social
scientific understanding of the concept.  As noted above, the major prob-
lem with a biological understanding of race is the lack of consistent crite-
ria to define specific races.  Consequently, and in light of the history of
racism in the United States and elsewhere, the Article sees race “as so-
cially constituted, culturally mediated, and politically maintained.”142
Although scholars disagree about how similar race and ethnicity
are,143 the two concepts intersect with each other to a degree.144  Both
ethnicity and race are social constructions of individuals within groups
and are open to abuse through discrimination.  One notable difference is
that ethnicity has a material basis that is lacking in race.  In other words,
aspects of ethnicity like food and clothing exist independently of rhetoric.
Another key difference is that awareness of race opens the door to discus-
sion of racism more than awareness of ethnicity does.145  Additionally,
race usually addresses how groups in power exercise their power to
marginalize outsiders.  This Article adopts the position that, although
race and ethnicity are not the same concept, they represent related, over-
lapping concepts and that a discussion of one usually benefits from a dis-
cussion of the other.
Based on the foregoing discussion, and to add doctrinal clarity that
reflects more theoretical clarity, Congress should add the term ethnicity to
135. Stephanie M. Wildman with Adrienne D. Davis, Making Systems of Privilege Visible,
in PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 18 (Ste-
phanie M. Wildman ed., 1996).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 17 (quoting Peggy McIntosh, Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege,
CREATION SPIRITUALITY, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 33).
138. McIntosh, supra note 137, at 17–18.
139. Carlson, supra note 109, at 126.
140. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 112, at 65.
141. For more on the complexity and contested nature of race, see, e.g., Haney Lopez,
supra note 132.
142. Koons, supra note 113, at 7 (also viewing gender and class in the same manner as
race).
143. MARTIN & NAKAYAMA, supra note 99, at 75.
144. Roberto Avant-Mier & Marouf Hasian, In Search of the Power of Whiteness: A Genea-
logical Exploration of Negotiated Racial Identities in America’s Ethnic Past, 50 COMM. Q.
391, 395 (2002) (exploring some of the various dimensions of racial and ethnic
identities).
145. MARTIN & NAKAYAMA, supra note 99, at 75.
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Title VII to address language discrimination claims.146  As noted above,
the term race is already included in the statute.147  If Congress had been
more expansive in its statutory rhetoric in 1964, Congress might have
used more encompassing terminology at the time, but understandings of
concepts like ethnicity and race have continued to develop in the years
since 1964.  Hence amendments are appropriate.  Today the statute
should contain at least all of the following terms: national origin, ethnicity,
race, color, religion, and sex.148  In this way, aggrieved parties can argue
that one’s language at the workplace, as a byproduct of one’s ethnicity,
should receive protection in specific cases.149  Also, despite the focus in
this Article away from the term national origin, the term should remain in
the statute since some individuals may suffer discrimination based on
their having been born outside of the United States and speaking LOTEs
in the United States.
Such protection would prevent some of the situations like the one at
the Paragon Inn in Taos, New Mexico, in which the owner fired several
employees for using Spanish at work.150  In addition to providing work-
ers, particularly lower-income workers, with greater protection against
the financial consequences that come with being fired, this amendment to
Title VII would provide such workers with protection against the erasure
of their personhood.  Since the victims of language discrimination gener-
ally lack social privilege and standing, they are especially vulnerable to
abuse and in need of further legal protection.
While the current terminology of Title VII needs amendment, the fed-
eral appellate courts already have begun, if only tangentially, to consider
ethnicity, sometimes in the same context as race, in analyzing cases of
language-based discrimination under Title VII.  For instance,151 the Fifth
Circuit has spoken of “racial and ethnic oppression,”152 as well as lan-
guage as a part of “ethnic identification.”153  The Ninth Circuit has dis-
cussed “particular ethnic, racial, or social groups,”154 “a target ethnic
audience,”155 “ethnic identity,”156 “racial or ethnic animus,”157 “ethnic
146. Some prior scholarship has used the term ethnic traits.  Perea, supra note 36, at
860–62.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2011).  Even though this Article conceptualizes race as a
social construction, such a construction can cause, and has caused, harm.  Accord-
ingly, Title VII should continue to prohibit discrimination based on race.  As long as
racism exists, society should continue to discuss race. MARTIN & NAKAYAMA, supra
note 99, at 75.
148. This list of terms does not preclude the addition of other terms that would provide
suitable protection.  Rather, the list is an attempt to develop the protections that
Title VII offers.  Another possibility would be ancestry. See Perea, supra note 36, at
832.
149. The next section of this Article considers some limitations on protection of language
in the workplace.
150. See Introduction, supra.
151. The following examples do not constitute an exhaustive list of uses of the term
ethnicity in these opinions.  However, they do give an idea of how ethnicity appears
in the various federal appellate opinions that have appeared since 1980.
152. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980).
153. Id. at 267.
154. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1987).
155. Id.
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tensions,”158 and “ethnic groups.”159 The Tenth Circuit has spoken of
“ethnic taunting,”160 “ethnic pride or ethnic discrimination,”161 and “eth-
nic pride or opposition to discrimination.”162  In one Tenth Circuit concur-
rence and dissent, Judge Semour used “ethnic pride,”163 “ethnic identity
and heritage,”164 “ethnic heritage,”165 “ethnic, racial or religious iden-
tity,”166 “ethnic and linguistic diversity in the workplace,”167 “ethnic
identity,”168 and “ethnic diversity.”169 Although some judicial rhetoric ex-
plicitly has tried to deny ethnicity-based protection,170 ethnicity has ap-
peared in judicial rhetoric on language discrimination.  This type of
ongoing rhetoric shows how, at least at an unconscious level, the judici-
ary has recognized that ethnicity is relevant to a discussion of language
discrimination.171
B. Responses to Objections to the Proposals of This Article
Contrary to the proposal of this present Article, prior scholarship has
questioned whether language, as a part of ethnicity, could receive any
protection under Title VII at all.172  This scholarship argues that, in 1964,
Congress was aiming to help Black Americans, who spoke English, and
not individuals who spoke languages such as Spanish.173  Also, the schol-
arship maintains that language, unlike Title VII categories in general, is
mutable and that only immutable characteristics should justify Title VII
protection.174
These objections to potential protection for language rights under Title
VII are notable but unpersuasive.  First, the purpose of Congress in 1964
does not have to be the same purpose that Congress would have today
because the social world has changed and become more complex over the
years.  The United States today is much more diverse than a world of
156. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District, County of Los Ange-
les, 838 F.2d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
157. Id. at 1051 (quoting Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1391–92 (9th Cir. 1980) cert. denied,
449 U.S. 875 (1980)).
158. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993).
159. Id. at 1489.
160. Maldonado v. City of Althus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1301 (10th Cir. 2006).
161. Id. at 1312.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1318, 1319, 1320, 1325, 1327 (Semour, J., concurring and dissenting).
164. Id. at 1319 (Semour, J., concurring and dissenting).
165. Id. at 1320 (Semour, J., concurring and dissenting).
166. Id. at 1321 (Semour, J., concurring and dissenting).
167. Id. at 1322 (Semour, J., concurring and dissenting).
168.  Id. at 1319, 1321, 1327 (Semour, J., concurring and dissenting).
169. Id. at 1327 (Semour, J., concurring and dissenting).
170. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993).
171. Whether the judges who wrote the opinions intended to open the door to considera-
tion of ethnicity is another matter.  The judges, not necessarily trained to have de-
veloped humanistic or social science understandings of ethnicity, may have been
unaware of the implications of their rhetoric.  Still, ethnicity crept into the rhetoric,
and, since ethnicity can be a target for discrimination, the term was not out of place.
172. See generally Leonard, supra note 42.
173. Id. at 102–03.
174. Id. at 117.
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White, Black, and other.175  The country is made up of individuals from a
wide variety of groups, as well as individuals who are bi-racial and
multi-racial and consequently self-identify with two or more groups.176
Continuing immigration adds to the need for a broader understanding of
the population.177  Congress simply can amend the statute to include
ethnicity, which opens the door to arguments for protection of language.
The rationale, as laid out above, is that ethnicity should receive protection
under Title VII and that language is a part of ethnicity.
Second, while some of the categories that Title VII protects are immu-
table, not all areas are.  Title VII protects against discrimination based on
religion, but one’s religious beliefs can change over time.  For example,
based on life experiences or reflection, one might become more or less
religious, find or lose faith, or convert to another faith tradition.  Addi-
tionally, since race is largely a social construction, as observed above, race
becomes a mutable concept.  Race can vary with rhetoric.  Along the same
lines, a member of one race, socially constructed as that race may be, can
pass as a member of another race.178  When passing, a passer performs a
privileged identity179 and destabilizes privilege based on race.180  For in-
175. In 1964, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated that the U.S. population consisted of the
following: 169,256,724 Whites; 20,671,914 Blacks; and 1,960,153 individuals of other
races.  At that time, the estimate for the entire population of the country was
191,888,791. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIVISION, RESIDENT POPULATION
PLUS ARMED FORCES OVERSEAS – ESTIMATES BY AGE, SEX, AND RACE:  JULY 1, 1964
(Internet Release Oct. 1, 2004), available at www.census.gov/popest/archives/pre-1980/
PE-11-1964.xls.
In 2009, the Census Bureau offered a more complex estimate of the population.
The estimates were the following: 244,298,393 Whites; 39,641,060 Blacks; 3,151,284
American Indians and Alaskan Natives; 14,013,954 Asian-Americans; 578,353 Na-
tive Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders; and 5,323,506 individuals of two or more
races.  The fact that the Census Bureau considered being Hispanic an ethnic, rather
than a racial, characteristic complicated the figures; the data presented did not come
with a definitional distinction between race and ethnicity.  Nonetheless, the Census
Bureau estimated that the population consisted of 48,419,324 Hispanics and
258,587,226 non-Hispanics.  In 2009, the estimate for the entire population of the
country was 307,006,550. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIVISION, TABLE 3:
ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION BY SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORI-
GIN FOR THE UNITED STATES: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2009 [hereinafter TABLE 3: AN-
NUAL ESTIMATES] (Internet Release June 2010), available at http://www.census.gov/
popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2009/NC-EST2009-03.xls.
176. Unlike Census Bureau data from the 1960s, more recent Census Bureau data at-
tempt to consider bi-racial and multi-racial individuals. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
POPULATION DIVISION, TABLE 3: ANNUAL ESTIMATES, supra note 175.
177. Snapshot: America by the Numbers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 18, 2006), available at http:/
/www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6289898 (noting that, between
2000 and 2005, immigration accounted for about 40% of the growth of the U.S.
population).
178. Helene A. Shugart, Performing Ambiguity: The Passing of Ellen DeGeneres, 23 TEXT &
PERFORMANCE Q. 30, 30 (2003).  In the absence of legal protection for Blacks during
the late 1800s and early 1900s, racial passing was an especially common perform-
ance. Id.  Under such circumstances, “skin colour was not always an obvious indi-
cator of race.” Id.  Although less common today, racial passing is still salient. Id. at
31.
179. Catherine R. Squires & Daniel C. Brouwer, In/Discernable Bodies: The Politics of Pass-
ing in Dominant and Marginal Media, 19 CRIT. STUD. MEDIA COMM. 283 (2002).  Typi-
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stance, a light-skinned Black person might pass as a White person.181  Al-
though some risk is involved,182 passing can be a way of subverting
“traditional notions of identity and belonging”183 and supporting “dis-
courses of dissent.”184  Hence, Title VII protects mutable characteristics as
well as immutable characteristics, and, if language were completely mu-
table, parties could argue that, through ethnicity, Title VII protection
should extend to language.
Even if all categories under Title VII required immutability, which
they do not, language is only quasi-mutable.  One can learn a new lan-
guage, but this is much more laborious as one becomes an adult.185  Some
individuals “are total failures at second language learning,”186 and even
educated individuals may never become fluent in their new languages.
Few adults ever lose all distinguishing features of their native languages
in their second languages; therefore, many advanced speakers remain
identifiable as speakers of their first languages even when they speak En-
glish well, and, even if second-generation children learn English with na-
tive features through school, first-generation immigrants who speak
LOTEs will likely never speak at a native level.187  Influence from the na-
tive tongue may remain in the community, and dialectical features of the
immigrants’ English mean that their English will be distinctive from other
variants of the English language.  When one’s children have learned En-
glish, another immigrant family that speaks no English will arrive and
start the process again.  At most times, someone will speak another lan-
guage besides English and slowly be learning some English.  Learning a
new language, even partially, takes years.  One does not learn even part
of a new language as casually as one might adopt a new shade of hair
color.
Given this analysis, aggrieved parties would be able to argue that lan-
guage, as part of ethnicity, should receive protection under Title VII.
Congressional intent from a distant world does not control congressional
cally, passing involves two other actors beside the passer.  The in-group clairvoyant,
another member of the marginalized group, can see through the pass, while the
dupe, a member of the privileged group, cannot see through the pass. Id.
180. Id. at 287.
181. See generally Avant-Mier & Hasian, supra note 144 (analyzing three legal cases in
which people challenged categorizations by passing).
182. Squires & Brouwer, supra note 179, at 287.  Dominant social groups see passing as a
transgression. Id.  When a passer has been revealed, several possibilities, including
scandal, interrogation, legal proceedings, violence, and murder, have resulted. Id.
183. Jeffrey A. Bennett, Passing, Protesting, and the Arts of Resistance: Infiltrating the Ritual
Space of Blood Donation, 94 Q. J. SPEECH 23, 27 (2008).
184. Id at 26.
185. FROMKIN & RODMAN, supra note 15, at 422. See also Leonard, supra note 42, at 119.
Although a child acquires most of the grammar of a language before age five, a pre-
pubescent child can learn a second language as well as the first language, regardless
of the age at which the child learns the second language. FROMKIN & RODMAN, supra
note 15, at 393-94, 422.  Unlike children, adults tend to be more self-conscious about
making errors in learning new languages. Id. at 423.
186. FROMKIN & RODMAN, supra note 15, at 422.
187. ALENE MOYER, AGE, ACCENT AND EXPERIENCE IN SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 1
(2004).  Limits on the mutability of language apply mainly to the immigrant genera-
tion.  Leonard, supra note 42, at 119–20.
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intent in today’s world.  Moreover, immutability is not a categorical re-
quirement for Title VII protection, and, even if immutability were re-
quired, language is at best quasi-mutable.
C. Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Analyses in the Courts
As argued above, Title VII needs amendment to add conceptual and
doctrinal clarity, but the burden-shifting frameworks from Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green remain the appropriate
analytic frameworks for language discrimination cases.  While language
discrimination cases tend to involve disparate impact and thus would fall
under Griggs,188 some language discrimination cases involve disparate
treatment and thus would fall under McDonnell Douglas.  In resolving
cases of language discrimination, courts should not defer to the EEOC
guidelines.
The EEOC officially has expertise in the area of employment discrimi-
nation but does not have substantive rulemaking authority.189  The EEOC
guidelines are entitled to judicial consideration,190 but courts can give less
weight to the guidelines than to administrative regulations that Congress
intended to have the force of law.191  Under the guidelines, the EEOC has
opted to excuse plaintiffs from showing proof of discrimination,192 which
is not the case in other Title VII cases such as those based on sex discrimi-
nation, and the EEOC has not explained how discrimination based on
language is more harmful than discrimination based on something like
sex.  Plaintiffs usually bear the initial burden of proof in litigating their
cases.193  As such, the EEOC has not justified the judiciary’s deference to
the guidelines.
Even if the EEOC did have substantive rulemaking power, the courts
should not follow what then would be administrative regulations.  In
general, when an agency has rulemaking power and the intent of the
Congress is not clear, a court asks “whether an agency’s answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.”194  Regulations are not to be
188. Raechel L. Adams, supra note 33, at 1339.
189. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).  To resolve a filibuster over the
1964 Civil Rights Act, members of Congress agreed to reduce the enforcement
power of the EEOC.  Stoter, supra note 6, at 601 n.33.
190. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).
191. See Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 141.
192. Meitus, supra note 25, at 913–14.  In Spun Steak, the Ninth Circuit said, “[T]he Su-
preme Court has held that a plaintiff in a disparate impact case must prove the
alleged discriminatory effect before the burden shifts to the employer.  The EEOC
Guideline at issue here contravenes that policy by presuming that an English-only
policy has a disparate impact in the absence of proof.”  Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998
F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993).
193. LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 828 (2d ed. 1994).  Here
burden of proof refers to the burden of production of evidence, or the burden of going
forward.  In addition to the burden of production, the plaintiff usually has the bur-
den of persuasion, or of ultimately making his or her case to the fact-finder, to
which burden of proof also can refer. Id. at 828-29.
194. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
According to the Supreme Court, a court must reject administrative constructions
contrary to a clear congressional intent. Id. at 843.
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“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” in ques-
tion.195  If the EEOC had substantive rulemaking power, the regulations,
as noted above, would shift the burden of proof for one type of Title VII
discrimination case, but not for others, allowing plaintiffs who sued
under language discrimination, but not sex-based discrimination, to
avoid having to make a prima facie case for discrimination.  For unknown
reasons, the plaintiff would be excused from making the prima facie case
a plaintiff normally would have to make.196  This type of regulation would
be arbitrary and not warrant judicial acceptance.
Consequently, the courts should continue to require that plaintiffs
make their cases for discrimination based on language.  In a disparate
treatment case, the employee would need to show that the employer in-
tentionally discriminated against the employee.  Then the employer
would need to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for the
treatment.  Finally, if the employer successfully offered a legitimate, non-
discriminatory rationale, the employee would have to show that the em-
ployer’s proffered reason was just a pretext for discrimination.  In the
more common disparate impact case, the employee would need to show
that the employer’s policy discriminated against the plaintiff in his or her
capacity as a member of a protected group.  After the plaintiff had shown
the disproportionate impact, the defendant would need to show a busi-
ness necessity for the rule.  If the employer successfully met this burden,
the plaintiff could win by showing that the employer could have used
other non-discriminatory means to satisfy the business necessity.
A logical inquiry would be about the nature of legitimate, non-dis-
criminatory reasons and business necessities.  A legitimate, non-discrimi-
natory reason would include an employee’s failure to comply with a
specific format for packaging a product, such as packaging a radio pro-
gram in English, rather than in English and Spanish, for an audience that
has called for English.197  Another example would be the lack of qualifica-
tions for doing a specific job.  A business necessity significantly serves an
employer’s valid purpose.  Rather than relating to a general social goal,
such a business necessity has to relate to performance on the job.198  Busi-
ness necessities come in a variety of forms.  Some examples include, but
are not limited to, communication with customers, coworkers, or supervi-
sors who speak only English; communication that takes place in emergen-
cies or other circumstances in which a common language is necessary to
foster safety; communication for cooperative work assignments where
English promotes efficiency; and communication that allows a supervisor
who speaks only English to monitor the performance of an employee who
is interacting with coworkers or customers.199
195. Id. at 844.
196. TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 193, at 828.
197. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1409–10 (9th Cir. 1987).
198. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
199. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL—
SECTION 13:  NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION § V(C) (2002), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-origin.html#V.
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This proposal recognizes that language, as a part of one’s ethnicity,
can receive legal protection from discrimination and that employers have
business interests, such as those noted above, to which they must attend.
The proposal is a compromise between excusing a plaintiff from proving
discriminatory action and allowing an employer to discriminate arbitrar-
ily against an employee based on the employee’s ethnicity, including a
dimension of ethnicity such as language.
D. The Linguistic Situations of Monolingual and Bilingual Speakers
Because monolingual and bilingual speakers are not similarly situ-
ated, several points regarding the two types of speakers warrant discus-
sion.  A monolingual speaker would speak a LOTE, and bilingual speaker
would speak English and a LOTE.  A bilingual speaker might be fluent in
two languages, or he or she might be fluent in a LOTE and have a degree
of proficiency in English.
In general, monolingual speakers of LOTEs should not have a prob-
lem with valid English-only policies.  Since an employer would have
hired a monolingual speaker of a LOTE with knowledge of the em-
ployee’s inability to speak English, the employer could not expect a
monolingual individual to speak English on the job.  Thus, firing an em-
ployee for his or her lack of English ability would not make sense.
On the other hand, bilinguals may face a slightly more complicated
situation.  Some bilinguals may not have a problem adapting to valid En-
glish-only rules.  Such bilinguals simply would follow the rules, and no
conflict would develop.  However, several features of bilinguals’ speech
patterns could cause difficulties.  Foremost is what linguists call code-
switching, via which bilinguals move back and forth between their two
languages while speaking with members of their primary cultural
group.200  This phenomenon can take place within a sentence or between
sentences.201  Code-switching “is often inadvertent and unconscious,”202
although that is not always the case.203  Bilinguals accustomed to speaking
with other bilinguals who code-switch are not always able, in a given
sentence, to speak one language or the other.204
An example of a code-switching situation is as follows.  One bilingual
Latina might be speaking with another bilingual Latina in a law office
about case files.  The first individual might say something like, “We really
200. EEOC v. Premier Operator Serv., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069-70 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(referencing the testimony of linguist Barbara Berk-Seligson).  A concise explanation
of code-switching is “language mixing.”  Roberto R. Heredia & Jeanette Altarriba,
Bilingual Language Mixing:  Why Do Bilinguals Code-Switch?, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 164, 164 (2001).
201. Id. at 1070 (referencing the testimony of linguist Barbara Berk-Seligson).
202. Id. at 1074 (referencing the testimony of linguist Barbara Berk-Seligson).
203. Celso Alvarez-Ca´ccamo, From “Switching Code” to “Code-Switching”: Towards a
Reconceptualisation of Communicative Codes, in CODE-SWITCHING IN CONVERSATION:
LANGUAGE, INTERACTION AND IDENTITY 29, 31 (Peter Auer ed., 1998); Colo´n, supra
note 13, at 250.
204. Alfredo Mirande, “Now That I Speak English, No Me Dejan Hablar [‘I’m Not Allowed to
Speak’]”:  The Implications of Hernandez v. New York, 18 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV.
115, 146 (1996).
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need to get these new files organized.  They should be bien organizados
ahora mismo [well organized right now].”  The second individual might
respond, “De acuerdo [Agreed].  The files have to be labeled ASAP.”
Although the phenomenon of code-switching presents a challenge for
negotiating language use in the workplace, the challenge is surmount-
able.  When a bilingual code-switches, she does not go on at length in a
LOTE; she may only utter a few words or a sentence, as the above exam-
ple illustrates.  Since code-switching can be a conscious process, the em-
ployee may be able to catch herself and begin to speak English.  If the
code-switching is not a conscious process, a system of warnings eventu-
ally would allow the bilingual to condition herself to address the prob-
lem.  In the absence of warnings, if an employer fired an employee for a
few brief, harmless uses of a LOTE, and if the employee had no prior
problems with her work record, the employee could argue that the em-
ployer used the policy as a pretext for discrimination.205
In short, if an English-only rule is valid – and that must be the case –
employees should be able to comply substantially.  Non-English speakers
cannot be expected to work in positions that require them to speak En-
glish, so they would not be at risk.  Some bilinguals naturally would be
able to comply, and bilinguals who had a harder time complying initially,
and only by a few words or several sentences, should be able to condition
their behavior through a series of warnings so that the employees would
minimize use of LOTEs.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that, unless a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason or a business necessity exists, Title VII can offer employees protec-
tion from language-based discrimination in the workplace.  Ethnicity, like
other categories, should receive protection under Title VII, and aggrieved
employees can argue that language is a dimension of one’s ethnicity.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs have the burden of proof in litigation of Title VII
claims, and consequently a plaintiff who sues under a language discrimi-
nation theory should have to make his or her case to the trier of fact.
Rather than thinking narrowly of Title VII in terms of protecting only
against fully-immutable qualities, the legal field would do well to think of
Title VII more generally as offering protection for employees at risk for
suffering unlawful discrimination.  As religion would suggest, protection
exclusively for immutable qualities was never the sole purpose of the
statute in 1964.  Immutability may be appropriate for some aspects of Ti-
tle VII, but, as noted above, immutability does not address the underlying
assumptions of Title VII fully.  The underlying assumptions of the statute
suggest that Title VII should protect vulnerable individuals in the work-
place, such as the employees at the Paragon Inn in Taos, New Mexico,
205. In Gloor, the plaintiff was fired for an instance of using Spanish, but the record
indicated that the employee already had several prior problems with his work per-
formance.  Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266–67 (5th Cir. 1980).
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from unfair discrimination.206 Accordingly, in the absence of a business
interest, ethnicity, as an umbrella for language, itself an easy target for
discrimination, deserves protection.
206. Some scholars would suggest that the law should offer protection for one’s identity,
or who one is. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Killing me Softly, with His Song: Anglocentrism
and Celebrating Nouveaux Latinas/os, 55 FLA. L. REV. 441, 449 (2003) (noting that “lan-
guage is inextricably tied to one’s sense of identity, as much for English speakers as
for Spanish speakers”).  Perea observes that workplace conflict over language is a
struggle for identity. Id.
Other scholars have problematized the notion that an individual has one iden-
tity. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 98-99
(1990).  These postmodern scholars critique the notion of identity as focusing on
substance at the expense of process or relation. Id. at 98.  Such a focus on one’s
identity “denies or represses difference” and “eliminate[s] uncertainty and predict-
ability.” Id. at 98–99.  To the contrary, the notion that one has several identities
recognizes difference, or a “heterogeneity of sensuous particulars,” within the indi-
vidual. Id. at 99.
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